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Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent
Statements: First Amendment
Considerations
If a negligent physical act causes an injury, the tort-feasor, absent a
defense of contributory negligence, is usually liable. If, however, that same
injury is the result of some form of speech,1 the First Amendment could
conceivably insulate the tort-feasor from liability.' Two recent state su-
preme court decisions' have barred recovery in such tort actions because
the defendants' actions were deemed protected speech. By adopting the
strict "incitement" standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio4 in one case,5 and
the closely related "clear and present danger" test6 in the other, ' these
courts have required a plaintiff to bear a heavy burden in proving culpa-
ble negligence.
This Note argues that the First Amendment should not impose so great
a bar to recovery, and that the authors and publishers of nonlibelous neg-
ligent statements' should be held liable in tort for the physical harm prox-
imately caused by such statements. 9 Instead of relying upon indeterminate
1. Assume that X publishes a recipe for what turns out to be a poisonous cake, and Y follows that
recipe, eats the cake, and dies as a result. A similar, though less tragic, case has actually been re-
ported. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (plaintiff injured as a result of
cookbook's inadequate warnings regarding poisonous ingredients used in recipe), cert. denied, 353 So.
2d 674 (Fla. 1977).
2. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Admittedly, a suit to recover for damages resulting from the negligent use of lan-
guage will not be based on a statute, but rather on common law tort principles. The First Amendment
still applies since common law tort liability is a form of state action. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("The test is not the form in which state power has been applied
but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
3. Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981); DeFilippo v. National
Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
4. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
5. DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1040 (R.I. 1982).
6. The "clear and present danger" test was first articulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) ("The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a dear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
7. Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 404, 276 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1981).
8. In this Note, the statements at issue will be referred to as "nonlibelous negligent statements." A
nonlibelous negligent statement is a nondefamatory statement that, because of negligence in speaking,
leads to injury even though no injury or law violation is intended or encouraged.
9. The analysis presented in this Note is directed almost exclusively toward "published" negligent
speech that causes physical injury. Of course, negligent speech-whether published or unpub-
lished-can cause a wide variety of injuries. For example, such speech can cause economic injury and
injury to reputation, as well as physical injury. This Note is limited to published speech that causes
physical harm because this is the one area in which no acceptable standards currently exist. The law
of libel comprises a coherent body of law with respect to injury to reputation. Similarly, the law of
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"core" First Amendment principles to decide these cases, courts should
employ the law of misrepresentation. The Note then proposes a
standard for nonlibelous negligent speech, and concludes that a proper use
of this standard will permit the compensation of many of the victims of
published negligent speech while still keeping liability within the bounds
of the First Amendment.
I. THE CASES AND THE DILEMMA
Several recent cases have struggled with the question of whether the
First Amendment precludes the imposition of tort liability for nonlibelous
negligent statements. In Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon," a child
was injured while performing an experiment suggested by a guest on a
children's television program. The court held that the case was governed
by the "clear and present danger" standard of Schenck v. United States.
12
deceit and misrepresentation already provides a proper framework of analysis for economic harm.
Even with respect to physical injury caused by unpublished speech, an acceptable governing body of
law is in place. See infra pp. 755-56. It is only when physically injurious speech is published that the
courts lack adequate guidance.
10. While this Note argues that the First Amendment should have only a limited effect on liabil-
ity for nonlibelous negligent statements, it does not suggest that the First Amendment is completely
inapplicable. This conclusion has, however, been advanced by several commentators. See, e.g., Roun-
tree, Constitutional Law, 33 MERCER L. REv. 51, 63 (1981) ("it is hard to believe that what was
claimed in Shannon has anything to do with the first amendment"); Wallis, "Negligent Publishing":
Implicationsfor University Publishers, 9 J. COLL & U.L. 209, 225 (1982) ("A plaintiff might [as-
sert] that the first amendment immunity was never intended to provide tort immunity for consumer
injuries."). The statements at issue, however, typically involve the public dissemination of knowledge
and information. See, e.g., Carter v. Rand McNally & Co., No. 76-1864-F (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1980)
(chemistry textbook); Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981) (televised
sound effects experiment). The First Amendment supplies at least some protection in this context. See,
e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (indicating that a rule that compels a
publisher to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions would be unconstitutional); Demuth Dev.
Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (the "right to publish free of fear of
liability is guaranteed by the First Amendment . . . and the overriding societal interest in the un-
trammeled dissemination of knowledge"); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF Ex-
PRESSION 3 (1970) (among the rights making up our "present-day concept of free expression" is the
right "to communicate ideas, opinions, and infonnation through any medium") (emphasis added);
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 257 ("Freedom of edu-
cation is . . . a basic postulate in the planning of a free society.").
Admittedly, not all of the cases regarding nonlibelous negligent statements involve attempts to dis-
seminate information. Some cases involve communications intended solely as entertainment. See, e.g.,
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975) (radio giveaway
contest); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (televised hanging
stunt). Still, even these statements are worthy of at least some First Amendment protection: "The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a free press]. Everyone
is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches an-
other's doctrine." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
11. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981). The Shannon case has been discussed in several recent
articles. See, e.g., Eldridge, Torts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 247, 254 (1981) (hailing Shannon as "a
landmark case"); Note, Broadcast Negligence and the First Amendment: Even Mickey Mouse Has
Rights, 33 MERcER L. REv. 423, 432 (1981) (supporting the Shannon decision).
12. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Though the Shannon court used the "clear and present danger" test,
it clearly felt that this test was analogous to the Brandenburg "incitement" standard. See Shannon,
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The Shannon court found no "clear and present danger" and, after ex-
pressing concern over the potential "chilling effect" of imposing tort liabil-
ity, reversed a prior judgment against the defendants.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reached a 'similar conclusion in
DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co.,t' a case involving a child who
died while imitating a hanging stunt he saw on television. Relying on
Brandenburg v. Ohio,"' the court held that the First Amendment barred
recovery unless the plaintiffs could prove "incitement. ' 15 Since no "incite-
ment" was proved in DeFilippo, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.
In two other cases, however, the First Amendment was not an absolute
bar to tort liability for nonlibelous negligent statements. In Weirum v.
RKO General, Inc.,'6 the Supreme Court of California held a radio sta-
tion liable for the death of a motorist forced off the road by two speeding
teen-agers who were participating in the station's promotional contest to
find a roving disc jockey. The court rejected the defendant's First Amend-
ment defense:
Defendant's contention that the giveaway contest must be afforded
the deference due society's interest in the First Amendment is clearly
without merit. The issue here is civil accountability for the foresee-
able results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to
decedent. The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than act.17
Weirum's reasoning was apparently followed in Carter v. Rand Mc-
Nally & Co.,"' a case in which a science textbook's failure to warn of the
dangers of an experiment resulted in physical injury to an eighth-grade
student. The judge did not grant summary judgment, suggesting that the
First Amendment was not seen as an absolute bar to recovery.19
While these four cases are the most important in the area, they are by
247 Ga. at 404 n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 582 n.2.
13. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
15. The Brandenburg "incitement" standard is presented infra note 31.
16. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
17. Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (emphasis added). While the court was
certainly concerned about the possibility of "unwarranted extensions of liability," it felt that the
"spectacular" circumstances of the case would prevent such unbridled extensions. Id. at 48, 539 P.2d
at 40-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73.
18. No. 76-1864-F (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 1980). This case is the subject of a number of recent
articles. See, e.g., Conrad, New Problems in Publisher Liability, AB BOOKMAN'S WEEKLY, May 18,
1981, at 3894; Swartz, You Can't Judge a Book By Its Cov'er, TRIAL, Nov. 1981, at 89; Wallis, supra
note 10; McQuaid, Publisher of Science Text Held Liable for Inadequate Laboratory Instructions,
Chron. Higher Educ., July 27, 1981, at 13, col. 2.
19. A jury eventually returned a substantial verdict for the plaintiff. See Wallis, supra note 10, at
209. The case, however, is not officially reported.
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no means the only attempts to extend tort liability to nonlibelous negligent
statements.20 There has been a gradual increase in the incidence of such
suits and, given the language in Weirun and the large recovery in
Carter,'2 1 many more such suits are likely to be filed in the future.
This burgeoning area of the law presents a troublesome dilemma. In
these cases, courts must balance the interest of society in compensating
injured parties against the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment. The disparate conclusions reached by the courts to date illus-
trate the difficult choices these cases require.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACHES TO THE DILEMMA
Both the Brandenburg standard and the related "clear and present
danger" test effectively bar recovery. If courts were to emphasize tort
principles, however, liability would often be imposed.22 The First Amend-
ment would limit recovery only in certain situations. The inappropriate-
ness of applying the Brandenburg standard, and the utility of common
law tort principles, as exemplified by the law of libel, suggest that the
latter approach is more appropriate to the statements at issue.
A. The Inapplicability of Brandenburg
The "incitement" standard articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio23 ap-
parently reformulates the "clear and present danger" test24 of Schenck v.
20. See, e.g., Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (publisher
of drug index that misstated toxicity of chemical disinfectant held not liable to drug manufacturer);
Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (bookseller not liable to purchaser for harm
caused by cookbook's failure to warn about poisonous ingredients), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla.
1977); Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (App. Div. 1974) (defendant not liable to
reader for harm caused by fireworks advertised in defendant's magazine); Young v. Mallet, 49 A.D.2d
528, 371 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975) (action for personal injuries incurred from following advice in pamphlet
dealing with vitamin consumption dismissed as to author for want of jurisdiction); Roman v. City of
New York, 110 Misc. 2d 799, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (wrongful conception claim based on
alleged negligent misrepresentation in booklet concerning contraception dismissed for lack of any duty
owed to defendant); Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (court
denied motion to amend complaint to include strict liability claim where plaintiff was injured as a
result of science textbook's failure to warn of dangers involved in experiment), modified, 88 A.D.2d
787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982).
21. According to his attorney, the plaintiff "ultimately [recovered] $1.1 million." Swartz, supra
note 18, at 110 n.2. Of this amount, the publisher apparently paid $100,000, and the teacher's insur-
ance company the remaining $1 million. See Wallis, supra note 10, at 209; McQuaid, supra note 18,
at 13, col. 2.
22. Liability will be imposed, of course, only when the tort requirements of negligence, legal
causation, and damage are met.
23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
24. It is unclear what effect the Brandenburg decision has actually had on the vitality of the
"clear and present danger" test. In concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas read the decision
as rejecting this doctrine. Id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 450-57 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). The majority opinion itself, however, never mentions the "clear and present danger" test. See
generally Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test For All Seasons?, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 151,
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United States.25 From Schenck through Brandenburg, the Court has at-
tempted to fashion a standard for speech that advocates action inimical to
the public welfare26 or to the security of the government.27 While not in-
herently limited to "political" speech, the standards in this area have most
often been applied in that context. Schenck, for example, involved a crimi-
nal conviction for distributing a leaflet opposing World War I and the
draft, while a number of later cases dealt with speech advocating the forci-
ble overthrow of the government.28 Such speech is clearly political29 and
lies at the "core""0 of the First Amendment. It is to this "core" that Bran-
denburg typically applies.
While Brandenburg provides essential First Amendment protections,
an unlimited application of this standard would be improper. Branden-
burg's "incitement" standard is limited to cases in which a statement en-
courages the use of force or the violation of law."1 Admittedly, this
standard potentially covers many kinds of speech. "Advocacy," for exam-
ple, while clearly including explicit statements of support and encourage-
ment, arguably also extends to almost any portrayal, whether or not it
was actually intended as a form of encouragement.32 "Law violation" also
158-64 (1975) (discussing relationship of the Brandenburg decision to "clear and present danger"
test).
25. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
26. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-95 (1950) (indicating that
"clear and present danger" test has been used to determine extent to which "First Amendment per-
mits the suppression of speech which advocates conduct inimical to the public welfare").
27. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions for conspiring to
advocate the overthrow of the government).
28. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning convictions of Communist
leaders charged under Smith Act with conspiring to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of
violently overthrowing federal government); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding
convictions under the Smith Act). For a discussion of these and related cases, see Comment, supra
note 24, at 151-57.
29. But see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 31
(1971) ("Advocacy of law violation is a call to set aside the results that political speech has
produced.").
30. The centrality of political speech to the First Amendment is recognized by the Supreme
Court. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) ("'[P]olitical speech [lies]
at the core of the First Amendment."') (quoting Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 303 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)
(indicating that expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values").
31. In Brandenburg, the Court held that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law ziolation except where such advocacy is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
32. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89
(1959) (characterizing movie's portrayal of adultery as advocacy in determining whether such portray-
als fall within First Amendment definitions of protected speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to "subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expres-
sion"); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("What is one man's amusement, teaches
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can be interpreted broadly. It conceivably includes both criminal and tor-
tious conduct, as well as any other "substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."
'33
Brandenburg should not be applied to nonlibelous negligent speech,
however, for these statements do not specifically encourage violation of the
law. By definition, such speech results in harm because of negligence on
the part of the speaker. A "wrong" is not "advocated" as it is in the case
of speech properly within the realm of Brandenburg.4 Moreover, under
the Brandenburg standard, the imposition of liability becomes more likely
as the expression becomes more effective, while with negligent statements,
the imposition of liability becomes more likely as the expression becomes
less effective. 5 Finally, liability for negligent statements does not depend
on whether the government approves or disapproves of the idea conveyed
by the message.
B. Libel Law: The Utility of Common Law Tort Principles
The inapplicability of the Brandenburg standard to nonlibelous negli-
gent statements and the growing number of cases involving such state-
ments demand the development of a different standard. Common law tort
principles, which will limit, rather than bar, access to judicial remedies,
are more appropriate than the Brandenburg standard. An analysis of libel
law especially suggests the utility of using tort principles in the First
another's doctrine."). See generally Note, Tort Liability of the Media for Audience Acts of Violence: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 S. CAL L. REv. 529, 556-67 (1979) (discussing meanings of "advocacy"
and "incitement" in context of television violence).
33. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
34. The distinction between negligent statements and ones that "advocate" violation of the law
can be illustrated by a comparison of DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I.
1982), with Olivia Nr v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888
(1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982). At first glance, these cases appear to be very similar. In
Olivia N., the plaintiff alleged that her rape was stimulated by the defendants' broadcast of a fictional
rape scene. The California Court of Appeal denied recovery since the plaintiff had failed to prove
"incitement" as defined in Brandenburg zt Ohio. See id. at 494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93.
Although DeFilippo used the same standard, the defendants in Olivia N. advocated illegal action,
whereas DeFilippo's hanging stunt was not illegal. The movie at issue in Olizia N. portrayed, and
thus "advocated," a rape-clearly an illegal act. In DeFilippo, on the other hand, the portrayal in-
volved only a hanging stunt. If done properly, as it was on the program in question, such a stunt is
neither illegal nor tortious. Thus, the application of the Brandenburg standard was arguably proper
in Olivia N. since the "advocacy" of some type of law violation was involved. The use of the "incite-
ment" standard in DeFilippo, however, was inappropriate since the case involved no advocacy of
illegal or tortious action.
35. Assume, for example, that some revolutionary desires to arm his forces with Molotov cock-
tails. With this in mind, he publishes a manual containing instructions on how to make these devices.
If these instructions are negligent, such that the instructions cannot possibly create functioning Molo-
toy cocktails, and the followers are injured while attempting to make the devices, the imposition of
liability will be on speech that is very ineffective. With Brandenburg, on the other hand, liability will
typically by imposed only on very "effective" speech. By definition, there can be liability only where
the advocacy is directed to producing, and is likely to produce, imminent lawless action. Thus, as the
revolutionary becomes more adept at, say, inciting the masses, liability becomes more likely.
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Amendment area. This is instructive, for nonlibelous negligent statements
are similar in many respects to libelous speech.
1. Libel Law
Tort law has already developed a framework that balances First
Amendment protection with the need to compensate an injured plaintiff.
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"8 the Court has granted a broad
First Amendment protection to libelous speech through common law priv-
ilege.37 Rather than substitute a new set of First Amendment standards
for existing tort principles in libel," the Sullivan Court expanded the
traditional privilege of "fair comment" to give proper First Amendment
protection to those who comment on the conduct of public officials.39 This
approach of "adjusting" tort principles to bring them into alignment with
the First Amendment led, in subsequent cases, to the relaxation of the
common law's treatment of libel against public40 and private '1 figures.
The system of libel law that has emerged from this process of adjust-
ment has been lauded by a range of commentators."2 This success demon-
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 282-83, 292 n.30.
38. The Supreme Court's failure to apply "traditional" First Amendment theories is particularly
striking since the closest analogy to the libel of public officials is found in contempt of court by
publication-an area in which the Court has used the "dear and present danger" test. See T. EMER-
SON, supra note 10, at 528-29.
39. The Court quoted at length from a state supreme court decision dealing with a public official
allegedly defamed by the publication of inaccurate factual assertions:
In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any one claiming to
be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. This privilege
extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and
candidates for office.
376 U.S. at 281-82 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 P. 281, 285 (1908)). At
the time of Coleman, this common law privilege of "fair comment" was not generally applicable to
false statements of fact. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 819-20 (4th
ed. 1971) (indicating that most states restricted the privilege to statements of opinion). The Sullivan
Court, however, held that the Constitution required this expanded version of the privilege. "[S]uch a
privilege [for criticism of official conduct]," the Court stated, "is required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." 376 U.S. at 283.
40. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), for example, a qualified privilege was
extended to those who make false statements of fact about "public figures." The common law privi-
lege of "fair comment," which was arguably applicable to "public figures," see W. PROSSER, supra
note 39, § 118, at 828-29, had generally been limited to statements of opinion. See id. § 118, at
819-20.
41. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that when the subject of
a libelous statement is a private figure, the defendant's conduct must be at least negligent in order for
liability to be imposed. Id. at 347 ("We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault,
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.") (emphasis added). The common law
rule, by contrast, had essentially been one of strict liability. See W. PRossERt, supra note 39, § 113, at
772-74.
42. See, e.g., T. EMEstSON, supra note 10, at 529 ("The libel cases . . . represent a significant
advance in the treatment of First Amendment issues."); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amend-
ment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 200-01 (1976) (supporting
750
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strates the utility of applying tort principles in the balancing process. By
tightening or loosening common law standards in accordance with the
First Amendment's mandates, tort law permits the compensation of in-
jured parties without contravening First Amendment principles.
2. Analogy to Nonlibelous Negligent Statements
Nonlibelous negligent statements have many similarities to libelous
speech,4" especially to "private" libel resulting from negligence by the
speaker. The injury in both instances will be the result of a breach of a
duty to exercise care in the use of language. Furthermore, in both situa-
tions the harm will typically be both unintended and unexpected. These
similarities suggest that liability should be allowed to a comparable extent
in both cases.
In addition, in allowing civil liability to be imposed for the tort of libel,
the Supreme Court has recognized a "strong and legitimate state interest
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.""' Since a
similar, and perhaps more compelling, state interest exists in protecting
individuals from physical injury, a state should be allowed to impose tort
liability where a negligent statement in a publication results in such harm.
Finally, as with the tort of libel, the proposed liability for nonlibelous
negligent statements does not depend upon whether the government ap-
proves or disapproves of the idea45 presented in the message. For example,
Court's intrusion into domain of private libel as sensible "compromise between . . . strongly opposed
and significant values").
43. The analogy between nonlibelous negligent statements and libelous speech is, admittedly, im-
perfect. For example, with many libelous statements the harm is intended, whereas, by definition, this
is not the case with respect to nonlibelous negligent statements. Furthermore, while it is arguably the
libelous words themselves that do the damage, a nonlibelous negligent statement will typically cause
harm only if there is some subsequent act of reliance. But cf Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and
the First Amendment, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 395, 409 (1982) (suggesting that, for First Amendment
purposes, misrepresentation and libel are quite similar since "[i]n either case, misplaced reliance on
false speech causes forseeable [sic] injury") (emphasis added).
The differences, however, do not significantly undercut the analogy. For example, since no liability
will be imposed unless the subsequent act was so foreseeably likely that the speech presented an
unjustifiable risk of harm, it is not crucial to the analogy that no harm will result from a nonlibelous
negligent statement unless there is some subsequent act. A substantial link between the words and the
harm is clearly required.
44. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).
45. The proposed liability for nonlibelous negligent statements would, of course, deter the "con-
tent" of the message as opposed to the time, place or manner in which it is communicated. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580-84 (1978). Thus, a more stringent First
Amendment analysis is required than would be the case if only noncommunicative impact were being
regulated.
The "content" of a message, however, must be distinguished from the "idea" it presents. For exam-
ple, were an author to suggest that, in order to become more politically active, women should take
massive doses of vitamin A, and were this diet to injure those who undertook it, the author would be
liable. Clearly, this imposition of liability implicates the content of the message. The words them-
selves, not the time or place of their communication, led to the injury. But the "idea"
presented-greater political participation for women-is not subject to liability.
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if a book on how to raise the American flag contains faulty instructions
that lead to physical injury, the author will be liable for damages even
though the government may well approve of the general idea of the book.
These analogies between nonlibelous negligent statements and libelous
speech suggest that a tort standard should be applied to nonlibelous state-
ments.46 The preceding analysis of libel law suggests that tort law will
facilitate a proper balancing of the First Amendment and the plaintiff's
need for compensation. Neither the Brandenburg standard nor the "clear
and present danger" test would allow a comparable balancing.
III. MISREPRESENTATION LAW
Of the available tort standards, those for misrepresentation seem most
appropriate for nonlibelous negligent statements."7 Misrepresentation law
has developed in light of the need to limit potential liability for negligent
speech;48 consequently, a coherent and sufficiently restrictive body of law
already exists for speech that causes economic harm. Insofar as it relates
to statements that result in physical harm, however, misrepresentation law
is less well developed. An analysis of the existing misrepresentation
standards in this latter area nonetheless reveals that, when considered
along with more general tort principles, the law of misrepresentation pro-
vides an appropriate standard.
Admittedly, the taking of vitamins could also be seen as the "idea." Such an argument, however,
misperceives what is being punished. One is entitled to advocate the taking of massive doses of vitamin
A. If one undertakes to "educate" the public in this way, however, the users must be apprised of the
dangers involved. The state is not so much suppressing speech as it is requiring more speech-i.e., a
warning.
46. One possible alternative is to characterize the harmful words as "conduct" or "speech com-
bined with conduct." A characterization such as this would arguably circumvent First Amendment
concerns. See Rountree, supra note 10, at 63 (suggesting that Shannon court "overlooked the inviting
option of treating the performance on television as conduct and not speech, or at least as conduct
combined with speech"). Most commentators reject this alternative, however. See, e.g., J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DismusT 109 (1980) (characterization as "speech plus" is "simply not responsible");
L. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 12-7, at 598-601 (indicating that dichotomy between speech and conduct
is persistent but unhelpful); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L.
REv. 372, 406 (1979) ("First amendment theories based on the distinction between speech and con-
duct have never been very successful.").
47. Cf McDermott, Liability for Negligent Dissemination of Product Information: A Proposal for
Assuring a More Responsible Writership, 18 FORUM 557, 564-72, 576 (1983) (suggesting utility of
misrepresentation law for negligent statements).
48. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (expres-
sing concern over prospect of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class"); W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 107, at 708 ("The spectre of unlimited liability,
with claims devastating in number and amount crushing the defendant because of a momentary lapse
from proper care, has haunted the courts.").
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A. The Applicability of Misrepresentation Law
While almost any misuse of language-whether negligent or inten-
tional-could conceivably be classified as a misrepresentation, tort law ac-
tually classifies very few types of tortious conduct as misrepresentation per
se.49 Misrepresentation is typically recognized as a distinct form of tort
liability only if the plaintiff has suffered economic harm.50 Where a
noneconomic injury has been suffered, the fact that it has been caused by
speech, rather than some other act, is rarely taken into account. This fail-
ure to focus on the speech and misrepresentation elements of the conduct
blurs any potential First Amendment analysis. Consequently, this Note
explicitly takes into account the incidence of speech and the specific form
that the speech takes.
Of the statements at issue in this Note, almost all can be classified as
cmisrepresentations" in the sense of speech that misstates the situation
such that the plaintiff is led to place himself or his property in danger of
harm.5" Misrepresentations are typically in the form of positive asser-
tions.52 Nondisclosure, however, such as a failure to warn, can also
amount to misrepresentation.5" The statements in Shannon, DeFilippo,
Weirum, and Carter can thus be analyzed as "misrepresentations," since
the harm typically resulted from the defendant's failure to warn of the
danger presented or, more explicitly, from his failure adequately to con-
tradict an appearance of safety."
49. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains:
Misrepresentation runs all through the law of torts as a method of accomplishing various types
of tortious conduct which, for reasons of historical development or as a matter of convenience,
usually are grouped under categories of their own. Thus a battery may be committed by feed-
ing the plaintiff poisoned chocolates or inducing his consent to a physical contact by misrepre-
senting its character. . . . Many of the common forms of negligent conduct. . . are in their
essence nothing more than misrepresentation, as in the case of a misleading signal by a driver
of an automobile about to make a turn or an assurance that a danger does not exist.
III RESrArEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 54 (1977) (scope note to ch. 22) (emphasis added).
50. See id. ("So far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a
distinct form of tort liability, it has been concerned and identified with resulting pecuniary loss.").
51. Cf W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 33, at 178 (describing situations in which a speaker will be
liable for negligent use of language).
52. See id. §§ 33, 106, at 177-79, 694-95 (suggesting positive misrepresentations can take various
forms).
53. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 161 (4th ed. 1971) ("often enough the misrepresenta-
tion consists, not in something [the defendant] said, but in his failing to say anything at all (i.e., to
warn)"); W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 33, at 179 ("In many situations, a failure to disclose the
existence of a known danger may be the equivalent of misrepresentation . . ... "); Phillips, Product
Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Causation, 2 HOFSMrA L. REV. 561, 571 (1974) ("Represen-
tations may be inadequate because of either partial insuficiency [sic] or total failure to warn or
direct.").
54. Cf Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 55-56, 41 A.2d 850, 852 (1945) (prominent
display of product name, "Safety-Kleen," and relatively inadequate warning combined to give product
misleading appearance of safety); J. FLEMING, supra note 53, at 161 ("Misrepresentations of safety
are a common cause of personal injury. . . which the law has long considered actionable, as in the
case of dangerous premises and products concealing a trap or flaw beneath a misleading appearance of
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Misrepresentations, of course, do not receive full First Amendment pro-
tection.55 They fall instead into that "category of utterances which 'are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' "5" This
description has been used to justify the imposition of tort liability for
libelous speech. Since, as shown earlier, libelous speech is analogous to the
speech at issue in several important respects, it is reasonable to see this
description as equally applicable to nonlibelous negligent statements.
B. Misrepresentation Law as It Currently Exists
Having established that the imposition of tort liability for nonlibelous
negligent speech is not repugnant to the Constitution and that misrepre-
sentation law provides an appropriate frame of analysis, the Note will
now examine the limits imposed by misrepresentation law on potential
liability.
1. Misrepresentation Law-Economic Harm
To recover damages,57 a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant
had a duty to exercise care in the use of his language and that he
breached this duty (a combination that amounts to a negligent misrepre-
sentation);58 (2) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the misrepresenta-
tion; 59 and (3) that actual monetary loss resulted. 0 While these elements
clearly parallel those of a typical negligence action, there are three signifi-
cant restrictions. First, there is no general duty to exercise care in the use
of language when only pecuniary interests are at stake."' Some "special
relationship" between the parties must exist in order for such a duty to
security.").
55. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961) (suggesting that "libel, slander,
misrepresentation, . . . false advertising . . and the like" are not accorded full First Amendment
protection) (emphasis added); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 388, 141
Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (1977) (same), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
57. While economic harm can be caused by either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations, see
W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 107, at 700-10, the analysis in this Note is restricted to negligent
misrepresentations since they are the most relevant to the matter at hand.
58. See id. § 107, at 704-10.
59. See id. § 108, at 714-18. This is essentially the legal causation requirement.
60. See id. § 110, at 731-33. For a general discussion of the elements of a negligent misrepresen-
tation action where pecuniary loss is involved, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
61. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.6, at 545 (1956):
The physical affairs of life are conducted on the assumption that everyone will so regulate his
conduct as not unduly to expose another to risk of harm to person or property. The law,
therefore, imposes the general duty of care. It is otherwise, however, as to the use of language
which, if relied upon, is likely to affect adversely another's pecuniary interest . ...
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arise. 2 A "special relationship" will generally be found only if there is
privity of contract between the parties, or if the parties are engaged in
some type of business or professional relationship at the time of the state-
ment, or if the defendant has some pecuniary interest in making the
statement.
63
The duty to use care in speaking is even further restricted with respect
to third persons. The defendant generally will be liable only to a "limited
group of persons" whom he intends to reach with the information, or
whom he knows the recipient intends to reach.64
Finally, the plaintiff's reliance on a statement will generally not be seen
as justifiable if he relies on an "opinion" as opposed to a statement of
fact. 5 If, however, a recognized expert gives a negligent opinion on a
point within his expertise, then the general rule against liability may not
apply. 8
2. Misrepresentation Law-Physical Harm
When an unpublished, negligent misrepresentation causes a physical
injury, there are few special restrictions on recovery. 7 In order for the
plaintiff to recover for physical damage caused by the negligent use of
language, he typically needs to prove only the general tort elements of
duty, a breach of that duty, and damage legally caused by the breach."8
62. Id. ("Whereas one is always under a duty not, by his act, to threaten unreasonable harm to
another's person or tangible property, there must be some special relationship between the parties, to
create such a duty in respect to misinformation negligently given.").
63. See, e.g., International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664 (con-
tractual relationship is one relationship that may lead to duty to use care in speaking), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 527 (1927); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 61, § 7.6, at 546 (business or profes-
sional relationship may require care in the use of language).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (1977); cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931) ("liability for negligence. . . is bounded by the contract,
and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made"). Under the Restate-
ment, it is not required that the defendant know, at the time the information is supplied, the precise
identities of the people in the limited group. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h
(1977).
65. See Dawson v. Graham, 48 Iowa 378, 380 (1878) ("In mere matters of opinion, every one is
presumed to rely upon his own judgment."); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 61, § 7.8, at 559
("One. . . type of representation that the courts have held ordinarily not of a type to justify reliance,
is a statement . . . [of] opinion."). Facts are statements that "relate[ ] to an event or state of affairs
which either exists at the present moment or has had a past existence . . . if that event or state of
affairs is susceptible of knowledge." Id. § 7.8, at 560 (footnotes omitted). Opinions do not satisfy this
standard.
66. See, e.g., Board of Water Comm'rs v. Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 74 A. 938 (1910) (engineer);
Bailey v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 72 Ind. App. 84, 121 N.E. 128 (1918) (physician); see
generally I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 61, § 7.8, at 561-62 (discussing circumstances in
which courts will modify general rule against liability).
67. As Professor Prosser points out, "[M]isrepresentation frequently occurs in ordinary negligence
actions for personal injuries or property damage . . . and the courts have not found it necessary to
distinguish it in any way from any other negligence." W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 107, at 704.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 33, at
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 93: 744, 1984
Two qualifications are necessary, however. First, as with statements
that cause economic harm, some form of "special relationship" must be
shown before a duty to exercise care in the use of language arises.69
Where the injury is to some tangible interest, however, this special rela-
tionship is not nearly so restrictive as it is in the case of economic harm.
70
The only general requirement appears to be that the communication must
be intended as a statement upon which people should act.
7 '
Second, the plaintiff's reliance on the statement must be justifiable in
order for there to be legal causation. As in the case of economic harm, the
plaintiff's reliance will generally not be seen as justifiable if he relies on a
nonexpert "opinion," as opposed to a fact.
72
Courts have had little trouble in applying the misrepresentation
standard to unpublished misrepresentations and imposing liability for
negligent speech. For example, if the plaintiff relies on an unpublished
assurance that a bridge is safe, or that there is no danger from blasting
operations, and is then injured as a result of this reliance, he is likely to
recover.73 Where the misrepresentation is published and the First Amend-
ment thereby brought into focus, however, liability is no longer clear, as is
apparent from Shannon and DeFilippo.
74
177-80.
69. See supra note 62; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 33, at 179 ("In all cases of negli-
gent misrepresentation . . . the circumstances must be such that the defendant is under a duty to the
plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in giving the information ....").
70. The physical harm standard is also less restrictive than the economic harm standard in an-
other area. With respect to third persons, the duty to use care in the use of language that might cause
physical injury extends to all those foreseeably injured by the statement. See Pabon v. Hackensack
Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 498, 164 A.2d 773, 784 (App. Div. 1960); J. FLEMING, supra
note 53, at 162-63. This is clearly less restrictive than the "limited group of persons" standard used
when economic injury is involved.
71. One generally accepted statement of this proposition is that: "There must be knowledge or its
equivalent that the information is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to
rely and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he will because of it be injured in person or property."
International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664, cert. denied, 275 U.S.
527 (1927). "Subjective" intent to have the audience act, however, is not strictly required. As the
International Products case points out, there must be "knowledge or its equivalent." Id. (emphasis
added). One generally accepted equivalent of knowledge is "substantial certainty." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); see also Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
(suggesting that, if defendant was substantially certain that harm would result, intent requirement for
battery would be met even though defendant never desired the result). Thus, where the speaker is
substantially certain that his words will be relied and acted upon, his lack of subjective intent should
not be seen as insulating him from potential liability.
72. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 111,534 P.2d 377, 381, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685
(1975) ("If defendants' assertion of safety is merely a statement of opinion . . . they cannot be held
liable for its falsity."); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 497, 164 A.2d 773,
784 (App. Div. 1960) (suggesting that only "factual report[s]" and "expert opinion[s]" are
actionable).
73. See W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 33, at 178.
74. In this Note, "published" speech refers to that speech which is in a fairly "permanent" form
or which has received wide distribution. A book, a newspaper article, a movie, and a television broad-
cast are all forms of "published" speech. The First Amendment, of course, does not distinguish be-
tween unpublished and published speech although the distinction is currently relevant in tort law.
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To allow the First Amendment to be an absolute bar to recovery in the
case of published misrepresentations, however, would seem strange in-
deed. For example, imposing liability when the assurance of safety is
given personally by some flagman but not when the assurance is dissemi-
nated through pamphlets makes no sense, because the defendant is likely
to endanger more people by publishing the information in pamphlet form.
Thus, while the First Amendment should be taken into account in this
situation, it should be seen as limiting the scope of tort liability rather
than barring its imposition. The use of the misrepresentation standards
that have been applied to "unpublished" speech would achieve this end.
3. General Common Law Tort Principles
As suggested by the law of misrepresentation, liability for negligent
words that cause physical injury will be imposed only if the statement was
both intended as a communication upon which people should act and
presented in the form of a factual statement or expert opinion. While
these principles imply substantial limitations, they are, by themselves, in-
sufficient to keep liability within constitutional bounds. It is only when
considered in connection with the full panoply of tort limitations on liabil-
ity, particularly the many limitations on the duty to warn, that misrepre-
sentation law sufficiently restricts liability for nonlibelous negligent
speech.
The notion of a "duty to warn" is central to the potential liability for
nonlibelous negligent statements: The negligence involved is generally a
failure to warn of some danger. If this duty to warn were unduly burden-
some, the First Amendment might well preclude liability. The duty to
warn, however, is not unconstitutionally burdensome. While this duty is
certainly expanding,75 it is far from universal-e.g., it does not even ex-
tend to all foreseeable injuries. Moreover, even when a duty to warn does
exist, this duty is not typically seen as onerous.
The duty to warn is subject to a number of important limitations.7,
Where a form of speech is "unpublished"-e.g., where a truck driver waves a following motorist on to
pass-courts have little difficulty in imposing liability for any physical harm. See id. Where the
speech is "published," however, the courts begin to balk because of the potential for unlimited liabil-
ity. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 405, 276 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1981) (failure
to provide absolute First Amendment protection would "open the Pandora's box"); DeFilippo v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1041-42 (R.I. 1982) (barring recovery after expressing con-
cern over self-censorship that might result from allowing recovery).
75. See Noel, Products Defecthe Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256,
264 (1969).
76. In discussing the duty to warn, Professor Prosser states:
[T]he seller is under a duty to give adequate warning of unreasonable dangers . . . of which
he knows, or should know . ...
One limitation commonly placed upon the duty to warn, or for that matter the seller's entire
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First, there is a duty to warn only if the potential danger is "unreasona-
ble"-a determination to be made after balancing the expected harm
against the difficulty of implementing an effective warning." The pres-
ence of speech should be taken into account as a factor tending to make
the implementation of an effective warning even more difficult.7 A second
limitation is that the speaker will be under a duty to warn only if he
knows about the danger or has reason to know of it.7 Finally, there is no
need to warn of dangers that are obvious, or should be obvious, to the
person relying on the statement.80 Even when a duty to warn is found, the
burden imposed is not typically oppressive. The warning "must be rea-
sonably calculated to reach [the users of the product], directly or indi-
rectly,"'" and expressed in language sufficiently clear, emphatic, and
prominent to alert the user to the potential danger.8 '
IV. THE PROPOSED STANDARD AND ITS APPLICATION
The standard suggested by the above analysis is a general tort standard,
modified by misrepresentation principles so as to take into account First
Amendment protections.8 3 In an action to recover for physical injuries,
liability, is that he is not liable for dangers that are known to the user, or are obvious to him,
or are so commonly known that it can reasonably be assumed that the user will be familiar
with them.
W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 96, at 646-47, 649 (footnotes omitted).
77. See id. § 96, at 646-47; Noel, supra note 75, at 264-65.
78. The implementation should be seen as more "difficult" in the sense that a court should be
much more reluctant to require a warning when speech, as opposed to, say, a consumer product, is
involved. When speech is the "product," warnings can be extremely disruptive. A packet of instruc-
tions and warnings will often greatly dilute the impact of speech, whereas this packet may have little
or no effect on the utility of a lawn mower.
79. See supra note 76; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(a) (1965) (supplier of
chattel must inform those who use chattel of dangers of which he "knows or has reason to know").
80. See W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 96, at 649. This limitation can be especially restrictive
since, in determining what is "obvious," courts often look to the regular users of the product. See, e.g.,
Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 204, 151 A.2d 731, 733 (1959) (warnings not
required because ready-mixed concrete is customarily sold to builders familiar with its properties);
Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 948, 227 P.2d 173, 174-75 (1951) (dangers
of cement mix are common knowledge, and thus no warning is required). If this group of users would
consider the danger "obvious," then the potential danger would, under this approach, be considered
"obvious" even to a totally inexperienced user of the product. See Noel, supra note 75, at 272-73
("Where . . .the danger as well as the defect is evident to most users of a product, the courts are
reluctant to find a duty to warn an occasional inexperienced user."). Thus, if seasoned picketers
realized that the kind of demonstration in question generally led to violence, a novice demonstrator
(with no reason to know of this incidence of violence) who was enticed to join the picket and then
injured by the violence, may be unable to recover on a "failure to warn" claim on the ground that
there was no duty to warn of this "obvious" danger.
81. Noel, supra note 75, at 281.
82. See id. at 283-84.
83. The degree of protection suggested is a "middle range" of protection similar to that currently
afforded commercial speech. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 758-62 (1976), the Supreme Court distinguished Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), and unequivocally held that the First Amendment protects purely commercial speech,
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liability will be imposed only if the plaintiff establishes the following ele-
ments. First, the defendant must be shown to have owed some duty of care
to the plaintiff in the use of his language. No such duty will be found
unless, as required by misrepresentation law, the plaintiff proves that the
defendant intended for the statement to be acted upon. General tort prin-
ciples relating to duty would also apply when not inconsistent with this
standard.
Second, there must be a breach of this duty amounting to negligence on
the part of the defendant."' This will often involve a failure adequately to
contradict an appearance of safety created by the words in question.
Third, the plaintiff will be obliged to meet the requirement of legal
causation. The plaintiff must prove that the statement inflicted a foresee-
though not as an absolute bar to the regulation of such speech.
Today, it is generally accepted that, while commercial speech is entitled to some degree of First
Amendment protection, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-82 (1977) (truthful, legitimate
advertising of price and availability of routine legal services is entitled to some First Amendment
protection); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (speech conveying information about a
product or service which is legal where offered may not be totally banned), it can be subjected to more
stringent regulation than would be permissible with respect to noncommercial speech. Compare Na-
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978) (suggesting that speech
furthering illegal price-fixing can be prohibited if the prohibition "represents a reasonable method of
eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct") with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam) (requiring likelihood of imminent lawless action before advocacy of law violation
can be proscribed).
Of particular relevance to this Note is the limited protection accorded to false or deceptive commer-
cial speech. Justice Stewart has stated that such statements are analogous to the "false statements of
fact" that, in the libel area, have been deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection. See Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 775-81 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("no constitutional value in false statements of fact"). Justice Stewart
reasoned that the regulation of false advertising will not deter truthful advertising. Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmaoy, 425 U.S. at 777.
While not entirely persuasive, see Farber, supra note 46 (suggesting that contractual analysis of
commercial speech is more coherent than Justice Stewart's analysis), Justice Stewart's explanation
points out an important similarity between unprotected commercial speech and nonlibelous negligent
statements. With both types of speech, the actionable words will generally be in the form of demon-
strably false statements of fact. For example, the dangerous properties of chemicals used in a science
experiment, or the probability of a balloon bursting if a BB is rotated inside, can be conclusively
determined. A careful speaker will know these facts and, if they suggest an unreasonable danger, he
will refrain from speaking or warn of the danger. It is when the speaker fails to do this that he is
liable.
84. A finding of at least negligence is required since a strict liability standard is unlikely to be
constitutionally acceptable. In the libel area, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant must be at
least negligent in order for liability to be imposed. See supra note 41. The similarities between
libelous statements and the statements at issue, see supra pp. 751-52, suggest that this same standard
is applicable here.
An important implication of this acceptance of some First Amendment protection for nonlibelous
negligent statements is that the instructions and warnings provided by product manufacturers may
also be entitled to such protection. For example, it may be unconstitutional to hold a manufacturer
strictI liable for failing to warn of a product's dangerous nature. While this idea has not been ac-
cepted by the courts to date, see McDermott, supra note 47, at 572 ("No manufacturer has success-
fully advanced the theory that the directions he sold with his product merited First Amendment pro-
tection."); Phillips, supra note 43, at 400 ("a first amendment defense is for some reason thought
inappropriate in products litigation involving failure to warn"), at least one commentator has sug-
gested the propriety of First Amendment protection in this area, see id.
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able injury on a foreseeable plaintiff. The plaintiff must also show that
his reliance on the statement was justifiable. Thus, as indicated in the
misrepresentation analysis, the statement will typically have to be in the
form of a fact or expert opinion.
Fourth, there must be an injury. Recovery should be strictly limited to
actual harm85 to minimize the danger that this tort standard might be
used to suppress protected speech. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that he
was not contributorially negligent.
To illustrate the operation of the standard, three examples are
considered.
Example 1. In DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co.,86 a television
talk show presented a hanging stunt wherein the host of the show was
supposedly hanged. The plaintiffs' son imitated this stunt and died. The
court used the Brandenburg "incitement" standard in this case and, after
finding no "incitement," dismissed the suit. This use of the Brandenburg
standard was improper since the activity encouraged (i.e., a hanging
stunt) was neither illegal nor, if done properly, tortious. Misrepresenta-
tion law provides the proper standard. Even this standard, however,
would preclude liability since the defendants did not intend that the view-
ers should act upon the stimulus. This lack of intent indicates that, in this
case, there was no duty to use care in the use of language.87
Example 2. In Walt Disney Productions v. Shannon,"8 a guest on a
children's television show invited the children to experiment with sound
effects by putting a BB inside a balloon. Plaintiff was injured when his
balloon burst, propelling the BB into his eye. The proposed misrepresen-
tation standard would impose liability (assuming no contributory negli-
gence) since (a) the negligent statement at issue was a factual statement
that was intended to induce action, and (b) there was a "proximately
caused" injury.
85. Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (the "countervailing state interest
extends no further than compensation for actual injury").
86. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
87. The finding of no duty in this case is troubling since, as with many of the cases being ex-
amined, the injured party was a child. Furthermore, the cases under examination typically involve an
invitation to participate in some potentially dangerous activity. See Wallis, supra note 10, at 222 ("the
information in textbooks is more dangerous ... because a textbook actively invites the reader to
perform potentially dangerous activities"). In tort law, these circumstances-infancy and "attrac-
tion"-will often lead to a duty where one otherwise would not exist. See W. PROSSER, supra note
39, §§ 33, 59, at 172-73, 364-66 (discussing "pied piper" cases and "attractive nuisance" doctrine).
The proposed standard, however, should not include an exception to the "intent to act" requirement
when children are involved. In this age of mass communication, almost any form of speech is poten-
tially available to a very wide and diverse audience-an audience that is very likely to include infants.
To allow infancy to circumvent the "intent to act" limitation would thus render it no real limitation at
all. Authors would constantly have to worry about reliance even where none was intended, an exces-
sive invasion of First Amendment rights.
88. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
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Example 3. Assume that someone publishes the following statement:
"In order to effect a change in government, people should make Molotov
cocktails and throw them at the President." The segment of this statement
that encourages people to throw Molotov cocktails at the President clearly
involves the "advocacy of law violation" and thus is covered by the Bran-
denburg v. Ohio standard. The Brandenburg test, however, should not be
applied to the part of the statement that encourages the mere makinge9 of
Molotov cocktails since this is not, by itself, illegal or tortious. It is to this
segment that the proposed standard should be applied.
If someone were injured while making a Molotov cocktail, a claim
against the author of the "Make Molotov Cocktails" statement would
most likely be based on the author's failure to warn of the dangers in-
volved. A proper application of the proposed standard, however, would
almost surely bar recovery. This is because there is apparently no "duty to
warn" in this case. As stated earlier, there is no duty to warn of "obvious"
dangers and it appears reasonable to conclude that the danger involved in
making a bomb is "obvious." It should also be noted that the duty to warn
is limited to "unreasonable" dangers, and it is unlikely that a statement
that merely suggests the making of Molotov cocktails really presents such
an unreasonable risk of harm. This is clearly different from the case
where someone gives specific-and defective-instructions regarding the
manufacture of a Molotov cocktail. 90
These examples indicate the many restrictions placed on recovery. It is
nonetheless possible that the proposed standard-essentially a tort
standard modified to take into account First Amendment considera-
tions-may chill certain types of speech. With a proper application of this
standard, however, the speech which is chilled will be of the type that we
want chilled-i.e., dangerously negligent statements that are really no
part of the idea communicated. This result is reached because of the sig-
nificant limitations placed on the imposition of liability. These limitations
operate to restrict liability to such a narrow band of speech that it would
89. It is assumed that the mere making of Molotov cocktails is not, by itself, illegal. Legal manu-
facturing might include that for a benign experiment or an historical recreation of 1960's violence.
90. It could be argued that the proposed standard will lead to undesirable consequences inasmuch
as it will encourage speakers simply to leave out the instructions. This consequence, however, is actu-
ally one of the desired results of the standard. If the speaker is concerned about the propriety of his
instructions, they should be eliminated. This will force the audience to consult a source that has been
considered by the author to be acceptable for publication.
Overall, the system imposes no duty to provide instructions other than as already required by law.
Where, however, one undertakes to provide instructions or information, there is a duty to exercise
reasonable care. In this regard, it is similar to the duty to rescue. See Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158
Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (no general duty to rescue, but once a rescue is under-
taken, it must be performed with reasonable care), aff'd, 247 A.D. 867, 287 N.Y.S. 136 (1936);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323-24 (1965) (same); W. PROSSER, supra note 39, §
56, at 340, 343-44 (same).
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be extremely difficult for the state to use the proposed standard to sup-
press protected speech. The use of the proposed standard, then, will allow
for the compensation of many of the victims of published negligent state-
ments while still keeping liability within constitutional bounds.
-Steven J. Weingarten
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